Ibn Bajjah was skilled both in the theory and practice of the mathematical sciences, particularly astronomy and music, adept in medicine, and devoted to speculative studies like logic, natural philosophy, and metaphysics. In de Boer's opinion, he conforms entirely to al-Farabi in his logical writings and generally agrees with him even in his physical and metaphysical doctrines.19 Let us examine how far this statement is correct in the light of the writings of Ibn Bajjah that have come down to us.
Ibn Bajjah has undoubtedly relied in philosophy and logic on the works of al-Farabi, but it is obvious that he has made considerable additions to them. Again, he has adopted an entirely different method of philosophical investiga¬tion. Unlike al-Farabi, he deals with the problems on the basis of reason alone.
He admires the philosophy of Aristotle on which he has founded his own system. But, he says, for understanding the speculative method of Aristotle it is of utmost importance to understand, first of all, his philosophy .correctly. That is why Ibn Bajjah wrote his commentaries on the works of Aristotle. These commentaries bear clear evidence that he studied the texts of Aristotle very carefully. As in Aristotle's philosophy, Ibn Bajjah has based his metaphysics and psychology on physics, and that is why his writings abound in discourses on physics.
MATTER AND FORM
De Boer writes: “Ibn Bajjah starts with the assumption that matter cannot exist without some form, while form may exist by itself, without matter.” But this is erroneous. According to Ibn Bajjah, matter can exist without form. He argues that if matter is not formless then it will be divided. into “matter” and “form,” and this will go on ad infinitum.20 Ibn Bajjah claims that the “First Form” is an abstract form which exists in matter that is said to have no form.
Aristotle defines matter as what receives form and is in a way universal. His matter in this sense differs from the matter of Plato who, though agreeing with the above definition, maintains that form in itself is real and needs nothing to bring it into existence. The aim of Aristotle is not only to state that matter and form are dependent upon each other but also to distinguish the particular form of a species from that of another species. The form of a plant is different, for example, from the form of an animal, and the form of an inanimate object differs from the form of a plant, and so on.
In the writings of Ibn Bajjah the word form has been used to convey several different meanings: soul, figure, power, meaning, concept. In his opinion the form of a body has three stages: (1) the general spirit or the intellectual form, (2) the particular spiritual form, and (3) the physical form.
He has divided the spiritual form into the following types: -
- The forms of circular bodies have only this much connection with matter that they make the material intelligibles perfect.
- The material inteligibles which exist in matter.
- Those forms which exist in the faculties of the soul - common sense, imaginative faculty, memory, etc., and are the via media between spi-ritual forms and material intelligibles.
Those forms which are related to the active intellect are called by Ibn Bajjah general spiritual forms, and those which are related to the com-mon sense are called particular spiritual forms. This distinction has been maintained because the general spiritual forms have only one relation and that with the recipient, whereas the particular spiritual forms have two relations - one particular with the sensible, and the other general with the percipient.
A man, for example, recalls the form of the Taj Mahal; this form is not different from the form of the actual Taj Mahal when it is before the eyes - this form has, besides the aforementioned particular relation, a relation with the general body of percipients, since there are many individuals who enjoy the sight of the Taj Mahal.
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
Ibn Bajjah wrote a number of small treatises on the administration of the House-State and the administration of the City-State, but the only available book on the subject is Tadbir al-Mutawahhid (Regime of the Solitary). As is clear from this book, Ibn Bajjah agrees to a great extent with the political theory of al-Farabi. He has, for example, accepted al-Farabi's division of the State into perfect and imperfect. He also agrees with al-Farabi in holding that different individuals of a nation possess different dispositions-some of them like to rule, and some others like to be ruled.22
But Ibn Bajjah adds to the system of al-Farabi when he exhorts that the solitary man (mutawahhid or the penetrative philosopher) should keep aloof from the people in certain circum¬stances. Even though avoidance of people is in itself undesirable, it is necessary in the endeavour to achieve perfection. He also advises him that he should meet the community only on a few inevitable occasions for a short time, and that he should migrate to those countries where he finds knowledge, migration being perfectly permissible under the laws of the science of politics.23
In his Risalat al-Wada` Ibn Bajjah has given two alternative functions of the State: (1) to estimate the deeds of the subjects in order to guide them to reach their intended goals and not any other ends. This function can be best per¬formed in the ideal State by a sovereign ruler. (2) The alternative function is to devise means for the achievement of particular ends just as a rider as a preliminary exercise acquires control over the bridle in order to become an expert in riding. This is the function of the administrators of those States which are not ideal. In this case the ruler is called the chief (ra'is). The chief enforces in the State a traditional system for the subjects' execution of all actions.
In the system of al-Farabi, as well as in that of Ibn Bajjah, the constitution is to be framed by the Head of the State, who has been equated by al-Farabi with a prophet or Imam. Ibn Bajjah does not mention this identity in so many words but he indirectly agrees with al-Farabi when he declares that “human perfection cannot be attained but through that which the apostles bring from God the Exalted (i, e., the divine Law or Shari`ah). Those who follow God's guidance cannot be led astray.”24 It is, therefore, too sweeping a state¬ment to say, “He (Ibn Bajjah) ignores the political relevance of the divine Law (Shari`ah) and its educative value for man as a citizen.”25
ETHICS
Ibn Bajjah divides actions into animal and human. The former are due to natural needs and are human as well as animal. Eating, for example, is animal in so far as it is done to fulfil need and desire, and human in so far as it is done to preserve strength and life in order to achieve spiritual blessings.
Ibn Bajjah draws our attention to the active human faculties, as man is too dignified to be qualified with the passive faculties which are either material or animal. The human faculty of learning is a passive faculty, but it is so in a different sense. The active faculty intends to attain perfection only, and then it stops, as in the art through which a trade is accomplished. But the repetition of the art is exercised only through the appetitive soul and opinion.
What is done due to the appetitive soul is the action which is done by the agent for its own sake. And, what is done by opinion is the action which is done to gain some other end. The appetitive soul desires a perpetual object, the desire being called pleasure, and its absence dullness and pain. Anybody who per¬forms an action in this way is regarded as having done an animal action.
Those who act through opinion act only in so far as they are men. Opinion either moves one to that which is essentially perpetual, or to that which is perpetual because it is abundant. If the action is perpetual due to abundance, then the end will take the place of the preliminary action. This end-seeking is either due to propensity only, in which case it is an animal action, or due to opinion which has an intended goal in the achievement of which lies its completion.
The end varies in accordance with the nature of the individuals; some people, for example, are born for shoe-making and others for other vocations. Ends serve one another mutually, and all of them lead to one and the same ultimate goal-the chief end. The chief man is naturally he who prepares himself to aim at the chief end, and those who are not prepared for it are subservient by nature. Some people are, therefore, naturally sub¬missive and are ruled by others, and some possess authority by nature and rule others.
Opinion is sometimes right essentially. It is so when it desires the eternal. Sometimes it is right accidentally and not in its essence. The opinions of the shrewd and crafty, for example, are right in respect of the objects they have set up before them; but they are not right-in-themselves. These opinions are relatively right but not universally so.
Colocynth is useful for a man of phlegmatic disposition, but not for all. On the other hand, bread and meat are useful both naturally and universally. The opinion which is right relatively as much as generally is right absolutely. But sometimes what is relatively right is not so in general, and is, therefore, right in one respect and wrong in another.
To declare an action animal or human it is necessary to have speculation in addition to volition. Keeping in view the nature of volition as well as speculation Ibn Bajjah divides the virtues into two types, the formal virtues and the speculative virtues. A formal virtue is innate without any trace of volition and speculation, such as the honesty of a dog, since it is impossible for a dog to be dishonest. This virtue has no value in man. The speculative virtue is based on free volition and speculation.
The action which is done for the sake of righteousness and not for fulfilling any natural desire is called divine and not human, since this is rare in man. Good, according to Ibn Bajjah, is existence, and evil is absence of existence. In other words, evil for him is really no evil.
MYSTICISM
Renan is right in his view that Ibn Bajjah has a leaning towards mysticism, but is certainly wrong in thinking that he attacks al-Ghazali for his insistence on intuition and Sufism. As a matter of fact, Ibn Bajjah admires al-Ghazali and declares that the latter's method enables one to achieve the knowledge of God, and that it is based on the teachings of the Holy Prophet.
The mystic receives a light in his heart. This light in the heart is a speculation through which the heart sees the intelligibles in the same way as a man sees the sunlit objects through eyesight; and through this apprehension of the intelligibles it sees all that which by implication precedes them or succeeds them.
Ibn Bajjah holds the friends of God (auliya' Allah) in high esteem and places them next only to the prophets. According to him, some people are dominated by corporeality only - they are the lowest in rank - and some are greatly dominated by a fine spirituality - this group is very rare, and to this group belong Uwais al-Qarani and Ibrahim ibn Adham.26
In his attitude towards God and His decree Ibn Bajjah comes close to declaring himself a fatalist. In one of the treatises he declares that if we were to refer to the decree of God and His power we would verily attain peace and comfort. All existing things are in His knowledge and He alone bestows good upon them. Since He knows everything essentially, He issues orders to an intermediary to invent a form like the one which is in His knowledge and to the recipient of forms to receive that form. This is the case concerning all existents, even concerning transitory matter and the human intellect.
In support of his view that God is the Ultimate Creator of all actions Ibn Bajjah refers to al-Ghazali's view, expressed at the end of his Mishkat al-Anwar, that the First Principle created agents as well as the objects of action to be acted upon; and he gets further support for this view from al¬-Farabi's observation, in `Uyun al-Masa'il, that all are related to the First Principle in so far as the First is their creator.
Ibn Bajjah also states that Aristotle said in his Physics that the First Agent is the real agent and the near agent does not act but through the First. The First makes the near act and the object to be acted upon. The near is known to the majority of people as agent only in affairs that concern matter. The just king, for example, deserves the ascription of justice, although he is distant in rank from him who is below him in the series of agents.
Whoever ascribes an action to a near agent is like the dog that bites the stone by which it is struck. But such ascription of action to the near agent is not possible in affairs which do not concern physical matters. The active intellect which surrounds the heavenly bodies is the near agent of all transitory particulars. But He who created both the active intellect and the heavenly bodies is the real eternal agent.
God causes the existence of a thing to continue without end after its physical non-existence. When an existent reaches its perfection, it ceases to remain in time (zaman) but exists eternally in the continuous flux of duration (dahr). Ibn Bajjah here reminds one of the Holy Prophet's saying: “Do not abuse dahr as dahr is Allah.” So interpreted, the saying implies that the human intellect enjoys eternal continuity. In support of this interpretation of the word dahr Ibn Bajjah mentions his predecessors like al-Farabi and al-Ghazali.
Rabu, 09 Oktober 2024